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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation founded 
in 1977 and dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free markets, 
and limited government. Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies 
was established to restore the principles of limited constitutional government that 
are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and studies, 
conducts conferences and forums, and produces the annual Cato Supreme Court 
Review. This case interests Cato because it concerns the application of basic First 
Amendment principles to social media, a critically important issue in the digital age. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Florida’s social media regulations purport to stop the “censorship of big tech.” 
Yet the method that the state has chosen for remedying this problem is to impose its 
own form of internet censorship. Florida’s law forces disfavored platforms to censor 
content they otherwise would include and to host material to which they object. The 
law grants special privileges to a favored class of users, discriminates among online 
voices, and allows some users (but not all) to override a platform’s editorial freedom. 
The law takes away a platform’s freedom to make case-by-case editorial judgments 
and gives judges the power to mandate that content be removed or retained based on 
 
1 Fed. R. App. P. 29 Statement: No counsel for either party authored this brief in whole or in part. 
No person or entity other than amicus made a monetary contribution to its preparation or 
submission. All parties have been timely notified and consented to the filing of this brief. 
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their own views of what is “consistent.” Further, the law establishes barriers to 
competition in the market for social media platforms. 
Platforms have a right to select and organize the content they host. They 
likewise have a right to decline to host content. This editorial right is not contingent 
on a platform’s prior exercise of the right, nor on whether a platform aims to present 
a “unified” message. Although social media may be a relatively new medium, long-
established First Amendment principles should be the guide to resolving this case. 
When platforms themselves speak, that speech is protected. When platforms publish 
content to the public, they are protected in doing so just as the publisher of a 
newspaper editorial or a book is protected. And when platforms exercise their 
discretion in selecting and sorting the content they present to users, the First 
Amendment protects those editorial choices. 
Although Florida claims that it seeks to undermine “big tech tyranny,” its new 
regulations actually benefit the largest and most established social media companies 
at the expense of present and future competition. By imposing steep liability for non-
compliance, these regulations would incentivize potential competitors to sell 
themselves to larger entities like Facebook once they approach the law’s threshold 
for regulation. Consequently, incumbents would enjoy competitive moats in contrast 
to the relatively frictionless conditions that allowed them to grow.  
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Further, the success of alternative platforms depends on their ability to 
compete and on the freedom of those building new platforms to develop new 
products. “Neutrality” requirements prevent the emergence of platforms with 
distinct, differentiable offerings.  
Whatever disagreement one may have with the editorial choices a particular 
platform has made, shifting control over those choices to the state is not the answer.  
  ARGUMENT 
I. PLATFORMS ENGAGE IN PROTECTED EDITORIAL ACTIVITY 
WHEN THEY PUBLISH, REMOVE, AND CURATE CONTENT 
The First Amendment protects a platform’s freedom to select the speech it 
wishes to host, a freedom that includes “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 
1997). Social media platforms do exactly that. Whether they select and edit with a 
light or heavy hand, all social media platforms must make choices about which third-
party content to permit and which to exclude on their platforms. These platforms 
screen and monitor content based on platform-specific rules and guidelines, 
withdraw previously published content, arrange content, and sometimes add their 
own message to that content. To give users a less cacophonous experience amidst a 
torrent of content, platforms actively rank, emphasize, and de-emphasize the speech 
they host. Thus, a core aspect of social media platforms’ operation is engaging in the 
editorial privilege that the First Amendment protects from government interference.  
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment freedom 
of speech encompasses the freedom to select, edit, and present speech. Writing in 
the context of a newspaper editorial page, the Court explained that “[t]he choice of 
material . . . the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content . . . and 
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute 
the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of 
Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).  
But this editorial freedom extends far beyond newspapers and other print 
media. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995) (finding that editorial privilege extends to parade organizers). It extends to 
any platform that hosts and presents speech, including online platforms. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (noting that First 
Amendment protections “do not vary when a new and different medium for 
communication appears”). See also La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 
981 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that the First Amendment extends to social media 
networks); Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(same regarding internet search engines); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007) (same). In sum, the First Amendment protects the 
selection of speech on a public expressive platform, and that right is to be construed 
broadly.  
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But Florida’s social media law, S.B. 7072, significantly infringes this editorial 
right for disfavored platforms. It imposes a 30-day ban on hosting certain speech 
through its “consistency provision.” It also forces platforms to forgo many of their 
standard moderation practices with respect to certain privileged users and imposes 
draconian penalties for noncompliance. To justify its abridgement of editorial rights, 
Florida argues that social media platforms are not entitled to First Amendment 
protections because they do not create a “unified speech product” and because they 
currently open themselves up for use by the general public with relatively light 
moderation policies. But the First Amendment’s protections are not contingent on 
either of these criteria. 
A. A Platform’s First Amendment Rights Do Not Depend on Whether the 
Platform Exercised Those Rights in the Past 
Florida argues that social media platforms have held themselves out to the 
public as viewpoint-neutral forums, and that for that reason it is constitutional to 
force them to remain viewpoint-neutral forums indefinitely. Def.-App. Br. at 36. In 
other words, Florida claims that social media platforms have forfeited their First 
Amendment right to engage in ideologically based content moderation by not having 
previously engaged in enough ideologically based moderation. 
First Amendment rights cannot be so easily forfeited. Even if it were true that 
all social media platforms currently “h[e]ld themselves out to serve the public 
indiscriminately,” that would not obliterate their editorial privilege. Def.-App. Br at 
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10 (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). And 
indeed, Florida’s factual premise is false. Social media platforms routinely make 
user access contingent on ongoing compliance with community standards, and this 
Court has upheld their discretion to decide how to enforce those standards. 
Illoominate Media, Inc. v. CAIR Fla., Inc., 841 Fed. Appx. 132 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(upholding the dismissal of a lawsuit by a political personality over her Twitter ban.) 
When Twitter removes content that it views as election misinformation, vaccine 
misinformation, violence, and even nudity, it engages in content-based and 
viewpoint-based moderation. Were it the government, those actions would be 
unconstitutional—but thankfully, Jack Dorsey holds no public office. 
Florida’s argument is, in essence, that social media platforms have not been 
ideological enough in their editorial choices, so it is permissible to impose on them 
common-carrier style speech-hosting obligations. But Florida’s “use it or lose it” 
theory of speech protections is incompatible with the First Amendment regardless 
of the aptness of common-carrier analogies. Then-Judge Kavanaugh identified this 
logical problem in his dissent in U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, which concerned the 
editorial rights of internet service providers:  
The FCC’s “use it or lose it” theory of First Amendment rights finds no 
support in the Constitution or precedent. . . It may be true that some, 
many, or even most Internet service providers have chosen not to 
exercise much editorial discretion, and instead have decided to allow 
most or all Internet content to be transmitted on an equal basis. But that 
“carry all comers” decision itself is an exercise of editorial discretion. 
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Moreover, the fact that the Internet service providers have not been 
aggressively exercising their editorial discretion does not mean that 
they have no right to exercise their editorial discretion. 
 
855 F.3d 381, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A social media platform’s choice to include all 
speech or most speech is likewise an exercise of that right. The First Amendment’s 
editorial privilege applies when an actor engages in editorial activity; it doesn’t 
depend on that actor’s historical exercise of that activity. 
B. A Platform’s First Amendment Rights Do Not Depend on Whether the 
Platform Offers a “Unified Speech Product” 
Florida argues that because “social media companies cannot be said to 
produce a unified speech product”—a viewpoint or message users can identify as 
originating from the platform itself—they receive limited First Amendment 
protection. Def.-App. Br. at 30. But the Constitution imposes no such prerequisite. 
Also referred to as a “common theme” or a “coherent” speech product, this 
point has received recent attention from scholars exploring whether platforms may 
be regulated as common carriers consistent with the First Amendment. See, e.g., 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms Have Editorial Rights? 1 J. Free Speech L. 143 
(2021); Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?, 
1 J. Free Speech L. 377 (2021). Proponents of the coherence-as-prerequisite theory 
argue that the Supreme Court has upheld infringements on the First Amendment 
rights of editors when their “message” lacked unification or coherency. They argue 
that the lack of a message made these infringements on editorial rights less grave.  
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But the Supreme Court’s own explanation of the rights of editors is 
incompatible with that view. “A private speaker does not forfeit constitutional 
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes 
to isolate an exact message.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70. The fact that an online 
platform chooses to host a wide range of views and topics is no basis for curtailing 
its First Amendment rights. That choice itself embodies a protected editorial 
judgment. If an editor chooses to host a wide range of voices and viewpoints, that 
editor does not forfeit the right to nonetheless exclude certain speech as off-limits, 
nor to prioritize some messages over others. Indeed, a contrary constitutional rule 
would encourage online services to allow less speech, not more, in an attempt to 
establish that they do in fact present a coherent speech product. The First 
Amendment does not require that paradoxical result. 
II. THE FLORIDA LAW’S REGULATION OF PLATFORMS’ TERMS 
OF SERVICE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Platforms have both protected speech rights when they speak and protected 
editorial rights when they edit. Florida’s law infringes both of these independent 
rights in several ways, including an outright ban on platforms’ own speech (“the 
addenda ban”) and two content- and identity-based must-carry provisions, which 
force platforms to host even the most offensive content if it comes from the 
government’s list of favored users. Fla. Stat. § 106.072 (1)(a); § 501.2041(2)(j). 
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No less constitutionally infirm are the law’s restrictions on platforms’ terms 
of service. Id. § 501.2041(2)(b), (c). Florida’s brief argues that these “consistency 
provisions” and their “neutral” limit on changing a platform’s terms of service more 
than once every 30 days are the least constitutionally suspect parts of the law. App.-
Def. Br. at 39 (“[I]f the Court rejects everything that has been said so far about the 
Act’s hosting regulations, it should still uphold the [consistency provisions].”). But 
for several reasons, these parts of the law cannot stand.  
First, the law’s “consistency provision” actually functions as a ban on speech, 
the type of First Amendment infringement the Constitution proscribes most strictly. 
Bhagwat, supra. Under Section (2)(b), platforms are forced to remove (or keep up) 
all content that is the same or similar to content they have previously taken down (or 
kept up).2 This provision works in conjunction with section (2)(c), which prohibits 
platforms from changing “user rules, terms, and agreements” more than once every 
30 days. App.-Def. Br. at 39. Taken together, the law creates 30-day cycles of 
censorship. Even if a platform wants to leave certain content up, it may not do so if 
within the past 30 days it has removed other content that a court might find to be 
similar to the content it wishes to leave up. This means that under the threat of 
 
2 How platforms are supposed to determine whether certain speech is the same or similar to other 
speech goes unexplained. 
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draconian civil penalty, platforms could be forced to remove speech that they wish 
to publish—a core First Amendment injury.  
Second, Section (2)(c)’s 30-day prohibition on changing a platform’s terms of 
service strikes at the core of platforms’ right to decide “whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content” by sharply limiting the exercise of these 
fundamental editorial judgments. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. By cyclically seizing 
control of platforms’ discretion over what to take down, what to leave up, and when 
the terms of service can be changed, the law does not merely “leave the substance 
of [content moderation] policies . . . entirely up to the platforms themselves” but 
instead functions to periodically remove their First Amendment right to select the 
content they host and display. Def.-App. Br.  at 39.  
Put simply, editors have a First Amendment right to make case-by-case 
determinations as to what speech they wish to display and what speech they wish to 
exclude. Florida’s law would, in the name of “consistency,” take that choice away 
from editors and place it in the hands of the state and its judges. 
III. THOSE DISSATISFIED WITH DOMINANT PLATFORMS SHOULD 
SEEK WAYS TO FACILITATE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
Ironically, in attempting to undermine the influence of large social media 
platforms, Florida’s law would likely cement their dominance. First, onerous 
regulations encourage would-be competitors to sell to incumbents. Florida’s law 
would create this dynamic by dramatically raising the cost of compliance, creating 
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a Florida-specific regulatory scheme and imposing severe penalties for violations of 
its must-carry and “consistency” provisions. Second, “neutrality” requirements limit 
the creative space for differentiated products. The success of alternatives to large 
platforms depends on competition and the freedom of those building new platforms 
to develop new products. Large social media companies are by no means 
invulnerable, but constraining their editorial discretion will cement the incumbency 
advantages they enjoy and delay the emergence of serious competition. Big Tech’s 
giants can afford a phalanx of lawyers and compliance officers; their would-be 
upstart competitors may not be able to. 
By complicating the regulatory environment and imposing high costs, Florida 
would accomplish the opposite of its stated goals by tilting the social media 
marketplace even more in favor of incumbents. Applying to platforms with annual 
gross revenues in excess of $100 million or at least 100 million monthly platform 
users globally, the law’s scope currently includes only Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
TikTok, and Wikipedia (with conspicuous carveouts for theme-park owning Disney 
and Comcast). By establishing such an arbitrary threshold, the law will give start-
ups the incentive to sell themselves to one of these companies before they themselves 
approach this threshold.  
Competitors who would normally expect to see a steady rise in the cost of 
moderating their new platforms will now face a step-change in expenses courtesy of 
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a splintered regulatory environment that now features a Florida state-level 
requirement. This new requirement would impose an unnecessary cost on existing 
large platforms, but it would have a much more significant impact on businesses 
considering founding their own platforms. These potential competitors would not 
only have to consider how to manage the new costs of achieving scale in a 
marketplace where size is a key metric of success. They would also have to anticipate 
the costs of other states’ introducing different bills. The result to the consumer will 
be fewer platforms offering fewer services. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The 
Political Spectrum (2017) (explaining how previous media regulations such as the 
FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” have frequently operated to entrench dominant media 
entities at the expense of smaller competition). 
Diverse platform choice and competition is better for consumers and better 
for groups who wish to reduce any individual platform’s influence. To the 
consumer’s benefit, more platforms would allow users to express disapproval with 
one platform’s editorial choice by spending time elsewhere. It would also strengthen 
consumer feedback by forcing platforms to respond more rapidly or risk losing their 
user base and their revenue. Groups who believe that platforms have too much power 
benefit both by increasing the likelihood that they can find a platform that meets 
their expectations and by witnessing a diaspora of similarly minded users from 
disfavored platforms. 
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Florida seeks to impose penalties of up to $250,000 per day for violations of 
its social media regulations. It has also purported to create both a public and private 
right of action for private accounts that have been “unfairly” or inconsistently 
removed, under penalty of up to $100,000 for each successful claim. It’s hard to 
imagine the next garage or dorm-room internet sensation emerging under such 
conditions. 
Further, consumers are best served by a competitive marketplace of both 
moderated and unmoderated platforms with distinct, differentiable offerings. 
Government-mandated “neutrality” requirements hamstring platforms’ ability to 
respond to consumer preferences by removing a critical dimension by which 
platforms can differentiate themselves: terms of service and community guidelines. 
Content moderation at scale will always end up frustrating large segments of the 
population, but a platform’s editorial discretion to moderate allows online platforms 
to create communities dedicated to certain subject matters or viewpoints and to 
remove hateful or harassing speech that may hinder the ability of users to engage 
with the platform.  
If states like Florida truly want to encourage a robust online speech 
marketplace, their goal should not be to bind platforms to a given political actor’s 
conception of neutrality. Instead, they should promote competition and reduce 
regulatory compliance costs to ensure that citizens remain free to choose alternatives 
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that might emerge from the same conditions of growth that current social media 
success stories have benefitted from themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The rights to free speech and press are fundamental and arguably our most 
cherished civil liberties. They have been essential components of our republic’s 
centuries-long successes. Whatever issues we may have with dominant social media 
platforms today, robust application of the First Amendment’s protections for speech 
and editorial control is not the problem. 
                                                              Respectfully submitted, 
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